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Abstract 
 
The United States spent over $400 billion dollars on national defense in 2005.  
Even with support for the war on terrorism still strong, it is doubtful that the U.S. can 
sustain such a level of defense investment.  One strategy to offset the increasing burden 
of defense spending is to divest the procurement and/or sustainment of individual defense 
capabilities to allied nations.  The decision to divest any capability, however, introduces 
risk.  This thesis presents a methodology to quantify the risk of the decision to divest a 
military capability to an allied nation, where risk is defined as the set of risk scenarios, 
likelihoods and consequences possible under each decision alternative.  Risk scenarios 
are composed of combinations of contingencies that require the capability considered for 
divestiture. The likelihood of each risk scenario is calculated as the product of the 
likelihoods of its constituent contingency events. The consequence of each risk scenario 
is calculated as the sum of the consequences of its constituent contingency events.  Once 
the risk of each decision alternative is quantified this information can be used to rank 
alternatives and identify the scenarios that contribute most to the risk of each alternative. 
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A RISK ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY FOR DIVESTING MILTARY 
CAPABILITIES TO ALLIED NATIONS 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The United States budgeted over $420 billion dollars for national defense in 2005, 
almost half of its discretionary budget for the year (Department of Defense, 2004).  In 
2004, the U.S. defense budget exceeded the defense budget of Russia, its nearest 
competitor, by over $334 billion dollars.  In this same year, the U.S defense budget 
constituted approximately 43% of entire world’s military budget (Shah, 2005).  Even 
with support for the war on terrorism still strong, it is doubtful that the U.S. can sustain 
such a level of defense investment in perpetuity. 
One strategy to offset the increasing burden of defense spending is to divest the 
procurement and/or sustainment of individual defense capabilities to allied nations in 
order to retain capabilities for use, but without bearing the entire cost burden.  Collective 
security relationships such as this are becoming more common as the costs of national 
defense escalate.  For example, Australia and New Zealand are engaged in an agreement 
termed Closer Defense Relations in which both nations deliberately seek to avoid 
duplicating military capabilities in their weapon systems acquisition programs (Quigley, 
2005). 
Divesting a capability, however, can introduce potential risks.  Will the host 
nation adequately procure and/or sustain the capability elements for which it is 
responsible?  Will the host nation employ the capability when it is required?  In order to 
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choose to divest or retain a military capability it is absolutely critical for senior decision 
makers to consider the risks associated with the divestiture decision.    
1.2 Military Capability Defined  
The Department of Defense’s focus on capabilities began in earnest in 2001 when 
the Quadrennial Defense Review directed the Department and Services to replace the 
service oriented, threat-based approach to defining defense needs with a new, joint 
oriented, capabilities-based approach called capabilities based planning (CBP) 
(Department of Defense, 2001: iv-vi).  Under this planning paradigm, a capability is 
defined as “the ability to achieve a desired effect under specified standards and 
conditions through combinations of means and ways to perform a set of tasks” (Crissman, 
2002: 23). 
 This capabilities-based approach is radically different from the former threat-
based approach in that it focuses on delivering “capabilities to meet a wide range of 
security challenges,” instead on defeating specific enemies (Joint Defense Capabilities 
Study, 2003: Chapter 1, 2).  In order to realize this capabilities-based paradigm, however, 
a shared capability lexicon is required.   
 This common lexicon is provided by the joint capability area framework.  Under 
this hierarchical framework, the highest-level capabilities are partitioned into broad 
classes called joint capability areas (JCA).  JCAs are formally defined in two levels or 
tiers.  The 22 Tier 1 JCAs represent “collections of similar capabilities grouped at a high 
level in order to support decision making, capability delegation, and analysis.”  Below 
these Tier 1 JCAs are 122 Tier 2 JCAs that “capture functional and operational detail that 
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translates to joint task force level operations/missions.”  The purpose of the Tier 2 JCAs 
is to “scope, bound, clarify and better define the intended mission set of the Tier 1 
capability category” (Crissman, 2002: 4-5).  Tier 1 and 2 JCAs are presented in Figures 
1.1 and 1.2. 
 
Figure 1.1 Joint Capability Areas (Crissman, 2002: 8) 
• Joint Battlespace Awareness
Collection & Monitoring (Enemy, Neutral, Friendly), 
Exploitation and Analysis; Modeling, Simulation, and 
Forecasting;  Knowledge Management
• Joint Command and Control 
Leadership, Decision Making, Situational Understanding/ 
Common Operational Picture, COA/Plan Development, 
Orders Dissemination, Collaboration, Liaison 
• Joint Network Operations
Physical-Transport, Services, Info Assurance,  
Knowledge Sharing, and Applications
• Joint Interagency Coordination
Interagency Cooperation Activities, Info Mgmt in 
Interagency Processes, Non-Governmental/Private 
Volunteer Organization Integration
• Joint Public Affairs Operations
Public Affairs, Domestic &  Foreign Public Information, 
Public Diplomacy, Media Relations, Internal Information, 
Combined/Joint Information Bureaus, Rapid Response to 
Misinformation, Counter-Propaganda 
• Joint Information Operations
OPSEC, Computer Network Ops (CND, CNA), PSYOP, 
Military Deception, Electronic Warfare
• Joint Protection
Protect Personnel & Physical Assets, Antiterrorism, 
Noncombatant Evacuation Ops, Personnel Recovery, 
Internally Displaced Persons Mgmt, Enemy Prisoner of 
War Mgmt, WMD Defense
• Joint Logistics
Joint Deployment/Rapid Distribution, Agile Sustainment,
Operational Engineering, Multinational Logistics, Force 
Health Protection, Logistics Information Fusion, Joint 
Theater Logistics Management
• Joint Force Generation
Organizing, Training (Individual & Collective), Equipping, 
Education, Recruiting, Manpower, Administration, 
Infrastructure Management
• Joint Force Management
Global Posture, Command Relationships, Global 
Visibility, Global Force Management, Adaptive Planning, 
Mission Rehearsal
Tier 1 & Tier 2 Joint Capability Areas
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Figure 1.2 Joint Capability Areas (Crissman, 2002: 9)  
 
 
 Tier 2 capabilities can be linked to sets of tasks, grouped into operational 
templates, defined by the Uniform Joint Task List (UJTL).  “The UJTL is a menu of tasks 
in a common language, which serves as the foundation for capabilities-based planning 
across the range of military operations” (Department of Defense, 2005).  Each task on the 
UJTL can be further linked to a set of service specific tasks and ultimately, each service 
level task is linked to individual units. This structure is illustrated graphically in Figure 
1.3.  
• Joint Homeland Defense
Security of the Mobilized Force, Bases, Reach-back 
Infrastructure, National Infrastructure, Continuity of 
Operations, Securing Domestic Approaches & Territory, 
Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP), Population 
Protection, Homeland Air & Missile Defense
• Joint Strategic Deterrence
Overseas Presence, Force Projection, Global Strike
• Joint Shaping & Security 
Cooperation
DoD Support to Nonproliferation, Security Assistance, 
Theater Security Cooperation, Inducements 
• Joint Stability Operations
Peace Operations, Security, Humanitarian Assistance, 
Foreign CM, Civil Affairs, Reconstruction, Transition
• Joint Civil Support
Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (Military Support 
to Civil Law Enforcement Activities (MSCLEA) & Military 
Assistance to Civil Disturbances (MACDIS)), 
Consequence Management (Domestic), Counter-Drug 
Operations, Continuity of Government
• Joint Non-Traditional Operations
Unconventional Warfare, Direct Action, Counterterrorism, 
Counterproliferation of WMD, Foreign Internal Defense, 
Special Recon
• Joint Access & Access-denial 
Operations 
Operational Access, Forcible Entry, LOC Protection, 
Freedom of Navigation, Basing, Seabasing, Blockade, 
Quarantine
• Joint Land Control Operations
Offensive Land Ops, Defensive Land Ops, Retrograde 
Land Ops, Operational Mobility, Control Territory, 
Populations, and Resources
• Joint Maritime/Littoral Control 
Operations
Surface Warfare, Undersea Warfare, Maritime Interdiction 
Operations
• Joint Air Control Operations
OCA, DCA, SEAD, Strategic Attack, Theater Air & Missile 
Defense, Force & Supply Interdiction, Airspace Control
• Joint Space Control Operations
Offensive Counterspace Operations, Defensive 
Counterspace Operations 
Tier 1 & Tier 2 Joint Capability Areas
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Figure 1.3 Capability Hierarchy 
 
1.3 Quantitative Definition of Risk   
 In order to quantify the risk of divesting a capability, risk must also be explicitly 
defined.  So what is risk?  Risk is the property of an event, in this case a decision 
alternative, which indicates that the event results in a spectrum of possible consequences.  
These consequences can be positive or negative; however, it is the negative, or adverse, 
consequences that are of particular concern to decision makers. 
 Conventionally, risk is quantified as the answer to the following three questions 
(Kaplan and Garrick, 1981: 1): 
• What event outcomes can happen? (i.e., What can go wrong?) 
• How likely is it that a particular event outcome will happen? 
• If it does happen, what are the consequences? 
The answers to these questions can be presented more compactly in the following triplet. 
 { , , }i i i cRisk S L= < >X , 
Uniform Joint Task List 
(UJTL) Op Templates
Joint Capability Areas
UJTL Tasks
Service Tasks
Individual Units
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where: 
• iS represents the scenario, 
• iL  represents the possibility of scenario is , 
• iX  represents the consequence of scenario is , 
• i is the index of the scenario, and 
• c denotes that the set is complete. 
Since a decision maker will likely be concerned with several different types of 
consequence, iX  is presented as a vector, each element of which represents a different 
type of consequence. 
1.4 Problem Statement 
 The task of this thesis is to develop a risk assessment methodology, drawing from 
the strengths of current methodologies, to assess the risk associated with the decision to 
divest a military capability to an allied nation.  The methodology presents a tractable 
procedure to generate the risk scenarios associated with divesting a capability and to 
determine the likelihood and consequence of each of these scenarios.  The product of this 
methodology is the set of risk scenarios, likelihoods and consequences that define the risk 
of each decision alternative.  This information can be used by decision makers to rank the 
decision alternatives and highlight the risk scenarios that contribute most to the risk of 
each alternative. 
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1.5 Organization 
This thesis is divided into five chapters.  Chapter 1 introduced the problem and 
provided a formal definition of capability and risk.  Chapter 2 summarizes the principal 
risk assessment methodologies, including quantitative risk assessment (QRA), 
anticipatory failure determination (AFD), risk filtering, ranking and management 
(RFRM), and failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA).  Additionally, it critiques 
several potential measures of risk.  Chapter 3 incorporates the strongest parts of each of 
these methodologies to create a methodology tailored specifically to address the risk of 
divesting military capabilities.  Chapter 4 provides a demonstration of the new 
methodology using notional data and Chapter 5 presents conclusions and suggests 
directions for further study.  The notional data used in Chapter 4 is presented in the 
Appendix. 
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2 Review of the Literature 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter accomplishes two tasks.  First, it critiques several existing risk 
assessment methodologies.  These include quantitative risk assessment (QRA), 
anticipatory failure determination (AFD), risk filtering, ranking and management 
(RFRM), and failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA).  Second, it presents the most 
widely accepted methods to express and measure risk, including variance, expectation 
and conditional expectation.   
2.2 Risk Assessment 
There are two fundamental questions with regard to risk that a decision maker 
may be interested in answering. 
• What is the spectrum of consequences, and associated likelihoods, possible under 
a decision alternative? 
• Which scenarios contribute most to the overall risk of that alternative?   
Both questions are intimately related and both are relevant to the decision to divest 
military capabilities.  However, each question is motivated by a different decision 
context.   
The context driving the first question is the situation in which the decision maker 
must choose a decision alternative.  This context will be referred to as the traditional 
decision context.  The goal of risk assessment methodologies in this context is to provide 
the decision maker with the entire spectrum of consequences possible for each alternative 
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so that this information can be used as a decision parameter, typically along with other 
attributes such as cost and benefit, to choose the best alternative.      
The context motivating the second question is that the initial decision has already 
been made and the risks associated with that alternative have been assumed.  This context 
will be referred to as the post-decision context.  In this context, the task is to determine 
which of the scenarios of the chosen alternative contribute most to the overall risk of that 
alternative so that mitigating actions can be implemented.  Both questions are important, 
and both are relevant to the decision to divest a military capability.   
While there is a large body of risk assessment literature, it is primarily oriented to 
specific fields.  The focus of this chapter, however, is to review generalized, application 
independent, methodologies. One consideration is that some of the risk assessment 
methodologies presented in this chapter only focus on certain parts of the assessment 
procedure.  As such, they are not comprehensive methodologies.  It will prove useful, 
however, to examine these partial methodologies, as the elements that they do address 
will be important components in a comprehensive risk assessment methodology.  Several 
of the principal methodologies for each context are analyzed.  Traditional decision 
context methodologies include QRA and AFD.  Post-decision context methodologies 
include the RFRM and FMEA.  
2.2.1 Quantitative Risk Assessment 
Kaplan’s QRA methodology presents a framework to quantify the risk of decision 
alternatives in a traditional decision context.  In this context, a decision maker is 
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interested in quantifying the risk of the decision alternatives so that it may be considered 
as a one of the parameters on which to base the decision (Kaplan: 1991, 11-39). 
The five steps of the QRA methodology are listed below. 
1. defining the risk scenarios via the theory of scenario structuring, 
2. defining the consequences for each scenario, 
3. calculating the likelihood of each scenario based on Bayes’ theorem, 
4. aggregating the likelihood and consequence into a probability of exceedance 
curve, and 
5. measuring risk and using the result to make a decision. 
The first step in Kaplan’s methodology is to identify all the possible risk 
scenarios.  Kaplan emphasizes that generating risk scenarios is more art than science and 
relies heavily on the analyst’s own creativity and experience.  Consequently, it is 
impossible to present an explicit, step-by-step methodology for generating risk scenarios.   
However, Kaplan does propose a general theory regarding scenario generation that 
provides a tractable paradigm to facilitate scenario generation.  This theory is called the 
theory of scenario structuring (TSS) and is composed of eight principles: success 
scenario, initiation, emanation, unending cause and effect, subdivision, pinch point, fault 
and event trees, and resources (Kaplan et al., 1999: 9-19).   
The eight principles of TSS define a framework that yields a logical paradigm 
from which to generate risk scenarios and that supports the theory’s ability to completely 
enumerate all the risk scenarios.  The first principle is the principle of the success 
scenario.  It states that in order for failure scenarios to be understood, the success, or as 
planned scenario, must be defined first.  Typically, the success scenario is thought of as a 
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trajectory in state space.  The principle of initiation is tied closely to this trajectory.  It 
states that any failure is simply a deviation from the success scenario trajectory.  
Additionally, this deviation must occur at a specific point, which Kaplan calls the 
initiating event.  The principle of emanation says that from each of these initiating events, 
an entire tree of scenarios can emerge.  The deviation points within these trees are called 
branch points.  All of the paths of the scenario trees terminate in end states.  A particular 
path, beginning with the initiating event, through the scenario tree, and terminating at the 
end state, is the risk scenario.  The principle of unending cause-effect states that the 
cause-effect chain “extends indefinitely in both directions.”  To make the problems 
tractable it is necessary to impose a finite scope on this chain.  The principle of 
subdivision says that “every scenario that we can describe with a finite set of words is 
itself a set of scenarios” which means that “it can be broken down into sub-scenarios” 
(Kaplan et al, 1999: 13).  This principle is important because, as will be discussed later in 
this chapter, it allows different sets of scenarios to describe the same situation.  The pinch 
point principle says that a scenario may contain pinch points, points at which the 
downstream tree is independent of the upstream tree.  Pinch points are simply points into 
which multiple paths feed.  The principle of fault and event trees is simply the 
observation that these types of trees can be used to determine the risk scenarios.  Fault 
trees are applicable when end states are given and event trees are applicable when 
initiating events are given.  Additionally, both types of trees can be used when mid-states 
are given.  The last principle is the principle of resources.  The term resources denotes 
“all the substances, fields, configurations, time or space intervals, or other factors present 
in a situation.”  The principle states that “if all the resources necessary for an initiating 
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event are present in a situation, then that event will occur” and conversely, “if at least one 
of the necessary resources is not present, then that event will not occur” (Kaplan et al, 
1999: 15). 
The purpose of this set of principles is to establish a framework in which a risk 
scenario can be defined.  In terms of these principles, a risk scenario is a particular path, 
beginning with the initiating event, through the scenario tree and terminating at the end 
state.  With this definition established, it is clear there are three ways to find risk 
scenarios.  The first is by finding all the possible initiating events and drawing outgoing 
event trees from each.  The second is by finding all of the important end states and 
drawing incoming fault trees for each.  The third is simply a combination of the previous 
two and begins with mid states from which both fault and event trees are drawn.  
 One of the critical requirements of a risk assessment is that the set of risk 
scenarios be complete.  If the decision maker has not defined a complete set of scenarios 
then value of his analysis will be questionable because he has neglected a possible source 
of damage.  Kaplan argues, however, that if followed with sufficiently thorough detail, 
TSS ensures that the set of scenarios it generates is complete.  His argument is based on 
two of its principles, the principles of initiation an emanation.  The initiation principle 
states that “any risk scenario must begin with an initiating event” (Kaplan: 1991, 24).  
Since every scenario begins with an initiating event, if the decision maker is careful 
enough in the process to ensure that every initiating event is generated, he needs only to 
develop the complete scenario trees for each of these events to account for all of the risk 
scenarios.  Accordingly, if the decision maker is careful enough when he draws the 
scenario trees, being sure that “the set of branches is complete at each branch point” then 
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“the set of paths in the tree constitutes a complete and finite set of scenarios emerging 
from that initiating event” (Kaplan, 1991: 25).  This implies strict fulfillment of the 
principle of emanation as well.  If the decision maker has completely defined the set of 
initiating events and for each of these completely defined the scenario space, then he has 
completely defined the set of risk scenarios.    
One common critique of risk assessment is that any scenario generating 
methodology cannot possibly generate all the risk scenarios.  An often cited example is 
that if two analysts perform a risk assessment on the same system they will almost 
assuredly produce non-identical scenario sets.  Kaplan rationalizes this inconsistency 
with the principle of subdivision.  This principle states that “any scenario is actually a 
whole category of scenarios.”  The example that Kaplan cites is the scenario “pipe 
springs a leak.”   “There are an infinite number of kinds, and sizes, and places on the pipe 
where a leak can occur” (Kaplan, 1991: 24).  Essentially, by defining each scenario as a 
set of scenarios, Kaplan relaxes the requirement that every set of scenarios for a given 
situation be identical.  This principle holds because the risk scenarios generated in each 
analysis could be different, yet entirely correct, if they are simply defined at different 
indentures in the scenario set hierarchy.  The result is that a scenario generating 
procedure based on the TSS principles produces a complete set of risk scenarios, even 
though they may not be unique.   
Once the risk scenarios are generated, the next step in the QRA methodology is to 
determine the consequence of each risk scenario.  Kaplan’s methodology, however, does 
not present an explicit methodology to determine these consequences.   
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The next step is to calculate the likelihoods of the risk scenarios.  The method that 
Kaplan proposes consists of two steps.  First, algebraic parameters are assigned to each 
initiating event and to each branch of their respective event trees.  The difficult part of the 
process is actually quantifying these parameters because it is unlikely that one will 
actually know the values of the parameters with certainty.  Therefore, the parameters are 
represented using probability distributions.  Kaplan suggests incorporating available 
information from subject matter experts vial Bayes’ theorem.   
Finally, to obtain the likelihood of each risk scenario, simply multiply the 
initiating frequency by each of the split fractions along that scenario’s path in the 
scenario tree.  If the tree parameters are distributions, which they will likely be, then the 
“arithmetic of the path equations will have to be carried out as probabilistic arithmetic” 
(Kaplan, 1991: 27).     
Once the risk scenarios, likelihoods and consequences of a decision alternative 
have been assessed, the risk of the decision alternative is presented as a probability of 
exceedance curve.  This data is then used in a utility model to rank the decision 
alternatives.   
2.2.2 Anticipatory Failure Determination 
Anticipatory failure determination is a relatively new tool in the field of risk 
assessment.  It is not a comprehensive risk assessment methodology but focuses instead 
on the scenario generation step of risk assessment.  The goal of AFD is to “identify, and 
bring to awareness, potential failure modes (“scenarios”) in our systems and operations, 
so that they may be “fixed” before they actually occur” (Kaplan et al., 1999: 5).  AFD is 
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an application of TRIZ, the Russian-developed theory of inventive problem solving, to 
risk analysis.  It provides a systematic, disciplined and exhaustive method to the creative 
process of scenario generation. 
The process AFD suggests is not innovative itself, as it shares the same 
foundation as the theory of scenario structuring.  What AFD adds is a new paradigm in 
thinking about how to generate risk scenarios.  The conventional question driving the 
search for risk scenarios has been “what can go wrong” (Kaplan and Garrick, 1981: 1).  
AFD turns the question around and asks “how can I cause this failure” instead.  In the 
terminology of AFD this is called an “inventive problem.” The benefit of this new, 
inverted paradigm is to defeat what Kaplan calls “the phenomenon of denial.”  This is the 
tendency of humans to “resist thinking about unpleasant things” (Kaplan et al, 1999: 45).  
When one is asked what can go wrong with a system, the tendency is to become 
defensive and deny or minimize the possibility of adverse consequences. If the inverted 
question is asked instead, the attention is placed on the offensive, proactive and creative 
capacity of a decision maker.  By avoiding the phenomenon of denial, it is much more 
likely that a complete set of risk scenarios will be developed. 
Kaplan partitions AFD into two types.  The goal of AFD-1 is to explicitly catalog 
the chain of causes in a failure that has already occurred.  In AFD-2, the goal is to 
identify all the possible failures that have not yet occurred.  “In the language of the theory 
of scenario structuring, AFD-1 starts with a given end state or mid-state and seeks to 
determine the actual scenario that led to that end or mid-state. AFD-2 seeks to envision 
all of the possible end states, mid-states and initiating events, and all the possible 
scenarios leading to and from these states. Thus we can see AFD-2 incorporates multiple, 
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repeated applications of AFD-1” (Kaplan et al, 1999: 21).  It is exactly the complete 
enumeration of risk scenarios in AFD-2 that a thorough risk assessment seeks to 
accomplish.  AFD is based on the same principles as TSS and relies on similar 
methodologies using fault and event trees to generate scenarios so its specific 
implementation need not be reiterated.  The overwhelming contribution of this 
methodology is not the mechanics of its procedure, but its inventive philosophy to 
generate risk scenarios under TSS. 
2.2.3 Risk Filtering and Ranking Methodology 
Risk filtering, ranking, and management is a comprehensive risk assessment and 
management methodology that “identify(ies) what can go wrong” and generates options 
to mitigate those risks (Haimes, 2004: 277).  This type of risk assessment addresses the 
post-decision context and seeks to determine the most significant contributors to the risk 
of a decision alternative.   
RFRM consists of eight phases: 
1. Scenario Identification 
2. Scenario Filtering 
3. Bi-criteria Filtering and Ranking 
4. Multi-criteria Evaluation 
5. Quantitative Ranking 
6. Risk Management 
7. Safeguarding Against Missing Critical Items 
8. Operational Feedback 
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In step one; Haimes uses his hierarchical holographic modeling (HHM) 
methodology to generate the set of risk scenarios.  It is deemed ‘hierarchical’ because 
HHM is geared toward understanding what can possibly go wrong at “many different 
levels of the system hierarchy” (Haimes, 2004: 90).  It is deemed ‘holographic’ because it 
is a multidimensional analysis of scenario structuring, rather than a single dimensional 
analysis akin to conventional photography.   
The goal of HHM is to enumerate all the possible sources of risk.  This can be 
quite difficult given the “multiple components, objectives and constraints of a system” 
not to mention the societal aspects including “functional temporal, geographic, economic, 
political, legal, environmental, sectoral, institutional, etc” (Haimes, 2004:90).  HHM 
overcomes this obstacle by assessing risk scenarios from many different overlapping 
perspectives.  Fundamental to the methodology is the belief that large-scale manmade 
systems have more than one single conceptual model.  Each of these models is equally 
correct, and is necessary to adequately describe the system.   
In HHM, risk scenarios are developed by decomposing the situation into broad, 
often overlapping perspectives or visions called head topics, and modeling the system 
with words according to each of these perspectives.    Each subtopic can be thought of in 
two complimentary ways.  Each subtopic is simultaneously a category of risk scenarios 
and a requirement for the success scenario.  Figure 2.1 shows an HHM decomposition of 
a hypothetical aircraft development project. 
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The strength of HHM is that it permits multiple modeling perspectives which 
facilitate a more complete enumeration of the possible risk scenarios.  However, since the 
perspectives may overlap, a risk scenario may appear in multiple decompositions of 
several head topics.  This feature of HHM is one of the major disadvantages of the 
methodology.  “The HHM approach divides the continuum (of risk scenarios) but does 
not necessarily partition it.  In other words, it allows the set of subsets (of risk scenarios) 
to be overlapping, i.e., non-disjoint” (Haimes, 2004, 94).  According to Haimes, this is 
not a problem if one is not required to quantify the likelihood of the scenarios, but this is 
what a decision maker seeks to do in a traditional-decision context. It will prove vital, 
then, to ensure that the risk scenarios are defined such that they are, in fact, disjoint.   
Phase two filters scenarios based on scope, temporal domain, and level of 
decision making.  This is the first of several phases that eliminates risk scenarios that are 
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not the primary contributors of risk.  One of the fundamental premises of RFRM is that it 
is impractical to apply quantitative risk assessment to all of the risk scenarios (Haimes, 
2004: 277).  In order to create a tractable problem, RFRM filters the set of risk scenarios 
down to only a few scenarios that are the major contributors of risk.  Phase one can 
generate hundreds, possibly even thousands of risk scenarios, so it is likely that not all of 
these scenarios will be of immediate concern to all levels of decision making and at all 
times.  “This phase often reduces the number of risk sources from several hundred to 
around 50” (Haimes, 2004: 281). 
Phase three also filters risk scenarios.  Filtering is accomplished by plotting a risk 
scenario on a severity matrix and evaluating its position within the matrix.  The location 
of the risk scenario is based on subjective expert evaluation of consequence and 
likelihood.  Decision makers will be concerned with those risk scenarios that fall in the 
severe consequence or high frequency regions of the matrix.  Risk scenarios that are not 
in these regions of the matrix are filtered.   
Phase four is the final filtering phase.  Filtering in this phase is based on “the 
ability of each scenario to defeat three defensive properties of the underlying system: 
resilience, robustness, and redundancy” (Haimes, 2004: 283).  Haimes defines 
redundancy as “the ability of extra components of a system to assume the functions of 
failed components,” robustness as “the insensitivity of system performance to external 
stresses,” and resilience as “the ability of a system to recover following an emergency.”  
Additionally, Haimes provides eleven criteria to assess these defensive properties.  These 
are undetectability, uncontrollability, multiple paths to failure, irreversibility, duration of 
effects, cascading effects, operating environment, wear and tear, hardware, software, 
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human and organizational interfaces, emergent behaviors and design immaturity 
(Haimes, 2004: 284).  The scenarios that can defeat these criteria are of paramount 
concern and are retained.   Those scenarios that cannot defeat the criteria may be 
eliminated.   
 In phase five, the likelihood of the remaining scenarios is calculated using 
“Bayes’ theorem and all the relevant evidence available” (Haimes, 2004:  285).  These 
likelihoods are then input back into the risk matrix in phase three, and, if necessary, 
scenarios are filtered again. 
Phase six is risk management.  Upon completing phase five, the scenarios have 
been filtered down to a small, more manageable number of risk scenarios that constitute a 
majority of the risk to the system.  In this phase one tries to answer the questions “What 
can be done, and what options are available?” and “What are the associated tradeoffs in 
terms of costs, benefits and risks?” (Haimes, 2004: 285).  The goal of this phase is to 
generate a set of options to mitigate the most severe risks. 
Phase seven is concerned with safeguarding against missing critical items.  In 
phases two through five, potential risk scenarios were eliminated via filtering.  But 
Haimes’ methodology has only suggested options to mitigate those most severe scenarios 
that have been retained.  The potential exists that some of these mitigating options may 
conflict with one of the eliminated scenarios.  This phase “ascertains the extent to which 
the risk management options developed in phase six affect or are affected by any of the 
risks scenarios discarded in phases two to five” (Haimes, 2004: 287).  If the options 
conflict with the eliminated scenarios then appropriate revisions to the options generated 
in phase six must be accomplished. 
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Finally, phase eight provides operational feedback.  As new sources of risk 
develop, their potential effects should be considered and new mitigation options 
generated if necessary. 
2.2.4 Failure Modes and Effect Analysis 
Like RFRM, failure mode and effects analysis addresses the post-decision context 
and seeks to determine which of the risk scenarios contribute most to the total risk of a 
decision alternative.  The FMEA process is typically used in industry, “during the 
conceptual and initial design phases of the system in order to assure that all the failure 
modes have been considered and proper provisions have been made to eliminate these 
failures” (Rausand, 5: 2004).  In this setting, the implied decision context is that the 
decision to initiate a project has been chosen and the decision maker is now concerned 
with determining which of the risk scenarios contribute most to the risk of that decision.  
According to Rausand, the process consists of the following steps: 
1. identifying the components of the system, 
2. identifying the potential failure modes of the components (risk scenarios), 
3. determining the effects the failures have on the system (consequences) and the 
likelihood of those effects (likelihood), and 
4. ranking the scenarios (Rausand, 3: 2004). 
The initial step is to determine the components of the system and the functions of 
each of its components.  This step begins by defining the system of interest.  Information 
about the system is gathered, in addition to information pertaining to previous or similar 
systems.  Next, system boundaries are defined, as are the primary mission, functional 
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requirements and the operational environment.  With all of this information in mind, the 
system can then decomposed into its fundamental components.   
This decomposition can be approached in two ways.  “The bottom up approach is 
used when a system concept has been decided.  Each component on the lowest level of 
indenture is studied one-by-one.” The top-down approach “is mainly used in an early 
design phase before the whole system structure is decided” (Rausand, 5: 2004).  This 
approach is function oriented and decomposes the system based on system functions.  
The decompositions can be functional block diagrams, schematics or other appropriate 
tools.  By decomposing the system into its fundamental units it is possible to enumerate 
each component or functional unit and describe its proper function.  The failure modes of 
the system, then, are simply the non-fulfillment of the functions of each of the 
components or functional units. 
The next step is to determine these failure modes, or risk scenarios, of the system.  
This step is called failure analysis and is accomplished by listing each function of each 
system component.  This enables the decision maker to consider the complete set of 
failure modes of the system.  Each of these failure modes is, by the triplet definition of 
risk, a risk scenario.   
For each of these failure modes, FMEA considers three parameters: the frequency 
of occurrence, O, the severity of the failure, S, and the likelihood that the failure will be 
detected before the system reaches the customer, D.  Each parameter is ranked ordinally, 
typically on a scale from one to ten.   
These parameters are then used to score each failure mode.  This is done by using 
one of several methods.  The first involves creating a severity matrix, with axes of 
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frequency and consequence similar to the method used in RFRM.  The scenarios that fall 
into the catastrophic/frequent regions of the matrix are the focus of mitigation efforts.  
The other, more common method relies on a figure called the risk priority number (RPN).  
This measure is similar to unconditional expectation of consequence, but is weighted by 
the likelihood that the failure will be detected before the system reaches the customer.  
The RPN can be calculated as either the product or sum of O, S, and D.  The state space 
of the RPN ranges from one to one thousand for a product RPN, or three to thirty for a 
sum RPN.  The RPN is an ordinal ranking in which a higher RPN  denotes a more severe 
risk scenario.  In this way, resources can be directed to address the most severe scenarios 
first.   
2.3 Expressing Risk 
Once risk has been defined, it is desirable to express it in some meaningful way so 
that decision alternatives may by ranked.  Obviously, one could simply express risk as the 
set of triplets that define it, but it is difficult to extract a comprehensive understanding of 
risk in this from, particularly when it is necessary to compare the risk of two decision 
alternatives. 
A more useful graphical representation is a cumulative probability plot which 
plots the consequence of a decision alternative versus its cumulative likelihood.  
Typically it is drawn as a probability of exceedance curve which expresses the likelihood 
that a consequence is equal to or exceeds a specified value.  This is an extremely 
important curve because it completely characterizes the risk of a decision alternative 
because it displays the entire spectrum of consequences possible under that alternative.  
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Consequently, the most comprehensive method to rank decisions alternatives is by 
comparing probability of exceedance curves.  A notional probability of exceedance curve 
is shown in Figure 2.2. 
 
Figure 2.2 Probability of Exceedance Curve 
2.4 Measuring Risk 
 Once the risk of a decision alternative has been quantified it is useful to measure 
the risk.  In order to function as an adequate proxy of risk, however, the measure must be 
carefully designed to account for the most extreme consequences possible under the 
decision alternative.  The subsequent section summarizes and critiques the principal 
measures of risk. 
2.4.1 Levels of Quantification 
One of the fundamental attributes of any measure of risk is the level at which it 
quantifies consequence and likelihood.  The least quantitative measures are easiest to 
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quantitative measures capture much more information but are consequently more difficult 
to calculate.  Kaplan partitions the levels as follows (Kaplan et al., 1999: 8): 
• verbal, 
• ordinal,  
• point estimate, 
• bounding estimate, 
• probabilistic, and 
• evidence based. 
The first two are qualitative and therefore, the easiest measures to calculate but 
are consequently the least precise.  In a verbal measure of risk, both consequence and 
likelihood are described with words (i.e. high, medium, and low).  An ordinal measure of 
risk, while it uses numbers instead of words, is only semantically quantitative.  Instead of 
assigning a verbal description of consequence and likelihood, these attributes are 
assigned a number value.  This value represents the rank order of the consequences only.  
Differences in magnitude of ordinal numbers are undefined. 
The next two levels of quantification, point estimates and bounding estimates, are 
the first levels of measurement that are truly quantitative.  Point estimates, unlike ordinal 
measures, actually represent the underlying magnitude of the system.  A bounding 
estimate is simply a pair of point estimates that, as the name implies, bound the range of 
the estimate.   
The last two levels of quantification, probabilistic and evidence-based, represent 
the highest levels of fidelity.  Instead of estimating consequence and likelihood as single 
numbers, these parameters are represented with probability distributions.  An evidence-
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based distribution simply means that Bayes’ theorem is used to incorporate all of the 
prior evidence available into the posterior distributions of consequence and likelihood. 
Since the higher levels of quantification capture more information, it is these 
levels that should be sought to achieve a comprehensive measure of risk.  However, it is 
important to bear in mind that not all situations will provide enough data to characterize 
consequence or likelihood quantitatively.  In these instances it is necessary to resort to 
qualitative measures. 
2.4.2 Qualitative Measure of Risk 
 If the likelihoods or consequences of a set of risk scenarios are assessed 
qualitatively, the methods available to measure the risk are limited.  Mathematical 
operations like expectation or variance have no meaning for categorical or ordinal 
quantities.    
 This suggests a severity matrix as an appropriate measure of risk.  Each risk 
scenario of a decision alternative is plotted on the severity matrix according to its 
likelihood and consequence.  Regions of the matrix are coded according to the decision 
maker’s values.  Regions with high likelihood and high consequences are classified as 
being the least desirable.  The more scenarios that appear in the critical regions of the 
matrix, the more risky the decision alternative is.  A sample severity matrix appears in 
Figure 2.3.  
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Figure 2.3 Severity Matrix 
 
2.4.3 Quantitative Measures of Risk 
One of the primary reasons for conducting a risk assessment is to evaluate a 
decision alternative based on its risk.  While a severity plot gives a much better 
visualization of risk than the set of triplets alone, it is difficult to make a risk conscious 
decision based on a graph.  One solution is to derive a scalar abstraction of risk; a 
measure of risk that is easily comparable and facilitates decision making.  
In defining this measure it is important to remain cognizant of the distinction 
between risk itself and a measure of risk.  Risk is, per the conventional definition, the 
entire set of scenarios, likelihoods and consequences.  But, by collapsing risk into any 
measure, a tremendous amount of information is lost.  To find a scalar measure that 
captures enough of the information contained in the set of triplets to make an informed 
decision is not a trivial task, yet this is precisely the goal of risk assessment procedures.  
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The ideal measure of risk is one that captures as much information from the triplet as 
possible but is still simple enough use as a decision parameter.  
As there is no single definition of risk common to all applications, there is 
likewise no single measure of risk common to all applications. Different fields use 
different measure of risk.  Below is a summary of some of the more common measures of 
risk.   
2.4.3.1 Variance as a Measure of Risk 
One common measure of the risk of a decision alternative is the variance of its 
consequence, X, given by 2 2[ ] [ ] [ ]V X E X E X= − .  Variance is an adequate measure of 
uncertainty in consequences; however, it is an inadequate measure of the consequences 
themselves because it neglects the impact magnitude (Sarin, 1993: 137).  For instance, 
consider the following gambles: gamble 1 one has a .5 probability of loosing $50 and a .5 
probability of winning $50, gamble 2 one has a .5 probability of winning $1 and a .5 
probability of winning $101 dollars.  Both gambles have the same variance, but it is 
intuitive that the first is more risky than the second because some of its consequences are 
negative, while the second gamble has exclusively positive consequences.  It is obvious 
from this example that some measure of magnitude is also necessary.  
2.4.3.2 Expected Value as a measure of Risk 
Another common measure of risk is the unconditional expected value of 
consequence given by [ ] ( )
x
E X xp x=∑ , where the random variable X represents the 
consequence.  This is also a poor measure of risk because it commensurates low-
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likelihood, high-consequence events with high-likelihood, low-consequence events.  
However, it is the former that most decision makers are primarily concerned with.  
Because of its simplicity, though, expected consequence is often employed as a measure 
of risk. 
2.4.3.3 Expectation-Variance Measure of Risk 
From the discussion above, it is clear that using variance or expected consequence 
alone as a measure of risk is inadequate.  However, a measure using both expectation and 
variance may be an adequate measure of risk. Pollatsek and Tversky suggest as a measure 
of risk a linear combination of variance and expectation of consequence using a constant, 
λ, which represents the decision maker’s preference between variance and expectation 
(Sarin, 1993: 137).   The measure is given by the following expression, where the random 
variable X represents the consequence: [ ] (1 ) [ ]Risk V X E Xλ λ= − − . 
2.4.3.4 Conditional Expected Value Measure of Risk 
Another measure or risk is the conditional expected consequence given by the 
following equation | ( )
| ( )
( )
[ | ( ) ]
( )
X P X
X P X
x p x
E X P X
p x
α
α
α ≥
≥
∗
≥ =
∑
∑ , where the random variable X 
represents the consequence.  This expectation is conditioned on the consequence 
exceeding a specified exceedance probability, α.    Haimes uses conditional expectation 
as a measure of risk in his partitioned multi-objective risk method, PMRM, which 
“isolates a number of damage ranges and generates conditional expectations of damage, 
given the damage falls within a particular range” (Haimes, 2004: 304).  
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2.4.3.5 Measuring Scenario Contribution to Risk 
In conducting a risk analysis the decision maker may very well be interested in 
measuring the contribution of an individual scenario instead of the aggregate risk of all 
the scenarios.  Any methodology that seeks to rank risk scenarios implies some measure 
of this type.   
Literature on measures of scenario contributions to risk is scarce, but a logical 
choice is the scenario-wise component of the unconditional expected consequence.  This 
measure is calculated by simply multiplying the consequence of each risk scenario by the 
likelihood of that scenario.   
2.5 Summary 
 This chapter presented several of the principal methodologies used to generate the 
elements of the risk of a decision alternative.  Additionally, several conventional 
measures of risk were presented.  In the next chapter, the best of these elements are 
incorporated into a methodology to generate and measure risk in the context of military 
capability divestiture. 
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3 Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
 This chapter presents a conceptual framework and associated methodology to 
quantify the risk of the decision to divest a military capability to an allied nation.   This 
requires a methodological procedure to assess the three elements that define the risk of 
each decision alternative: 
• Risk scenarios 
• Likelihoods 
• Consequences 
3.2 Decision Context 
 The decision of interest is presented as a decision tree in Figure 3.1.  The decision 
alternatives in this context include divesting a single capability to a specific nation or 
retaining domestic responsibility for the capability. 
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Figure 3.1 Decision Tree 
 
3.3 Quantifying the Risk of a Decision Alternative 
 According to the conventional definition of risk, the risk of a decision alternative 
is composed of the set of the following three elements. 
• Risk scenario - What can go wrong? 
• Likelihood - How likely are the risk scenarios? 
• Consequences - What are the consequences of each risk scenario?  
The subsequent sections present a methodology to generate each of these elements for the 
alternatives in the decision to divest a military capability. 
3.3.1 Risk Scenarios 
 The first step in the risk assessment process is to generate the set of risk scenarios 
possible for each decision alternative.  Risk scenarios represent everything that can ‘go 
wrong’ with the system in which the decision is made. In other words, risk scenarios 
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represent the events that initiate consequences.  In the context of capability divesture, risk 
scenarios are the possible combinations of real world contingencies about which decision 
makers are concerned.  Contingencies are defined as events in which the United States is 
required to use the military capability.  Notional contingencies, for example, could 
include a major regional conflict in Iran, humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan or 
stability operations in Iraq. Relevant contingencies must be identified by the decision 
maker or subject matter experts.   
 In order to generate a formally partitioned set of risk scenarios based on these 
contingencies, the set of contingencies must be mutually exclusive and collectively 
exhaustive.  These conditions ensure that consequences of the decision alternative are not 
counted more than once and that all relevant threats are accounted for.  Since the 
contingencies are not dependent on the decision alternative, both decision alternatives 
(divest or retain) are subject to the same set of risk scenarios; however, the consequence 
of the risk scenarios will likely be different under each decision alternative.   
 In order to form a complete set of risk scenarios based on these contingencies, 
each possible combination of contingencies must be enumerated.  With i contingencies 
and two states possible for each contingency (occurrence or non-occurrence), 2i unique 
risk scenarios are possible for each decision alternative.  A notional set of risk scenarios 
for each decision alternative, assuming two contingencies, is shown in the decision tree in 
Figure 3.2; where “1” represents the event that contingency i occurs and “0” represents the 
event that contingency i does not occur.   
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Figure 3.2 Decision Tree with Risk Scenarios 
  
 Each risk scenario and the state of every contingency that defines it can be 
represented more succinctly in tabular form.  In Table 3.1, “1” represents the event that 
contingency i occurs and “0” represents the event that contingency i does not occur.  
Table 3.1 Risk Scenarios and Constituent Contingencies 
 
3.3.2 Likelihood of a Risk Scenario  
 Assuming the contingencies are independent and the likelihood of occurrence of 
each contingency can be estimated by subject matter experts, the likelihood of each risk 
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scenario can be calculated as the product of the likelihoods of the states of the 
contingencies that define it.  This process is illustrated in the example below for risk 
scenario one, using the notional data in Table 3.2.  
Table 3.2 Contingency Likelihoods 
 
 
 
1 21
1
1
L(RS ) (1) (1)
L(RS ) .10 .30
L(RS ) .03
C CL L= ∗
= ∗
=
 
The likelihoods of the remaining scenarios are presented in Table 3.3. 
Table 3.3 Risk Scenario Likelihoods 
 
3.3.3 Consequence of a Risk Scenario 
 Once the likelihoods for each risk scenario are defined, the consequence of each 
risk scenario must be determined.  Given the compound nature of a risk scenario, 
however, evaluating its consequences can be problematic.   In particular, how can a 
subject matter expert reasonably evaluate the consequence of a risk scenario composed of 
dozens of contingencies?   
Contingency L(1) L(0)
1 0.10 0.90
2 0.30 0.70
RSj Likelihood
RS1 0.03
RS2 0.07
RS3 0.27
RS4 0.63
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 The most basic solution is to assume that the consequence of a risk scenario is 
additive.  Under this assumption, the consequence of a risk scenario can be calculated 
piecewise as the sum of the consequence of each constituent contingency event.  Thus, 
the consequence of each constituent contingency event must be evaluated.  A 
contingency event is defined as the occurrence event of a particular contingency.  The 
non-occurrence of a contingency is assumed to have no adverse consequence and 
therefore need not be evaluated. This concept is shown graphically in the Table 3.4 for 
two notional contingencies.  This structure requires that i contingency events be 
evaluated for each decision alternative, where i is the number of contingencies.   
Table 3.4 Risk Scenario Consequence Structure 
 
 
 
 Calculating the consequence of even a single contingency event, however, is not a 
trivial task. Each contingency event itself possesses risk because the consequence of each 
contingency event is determined not only by the event itself, but also by a “number of 
external factors” that are “unknown to the decision maker at the time of the decision” 
(French, 1986: 33).  These factors are defined by contingency scenarios, which describe 
the possible levels of capability required by the contingency event and the possible levels 
of capability made available by the host nation.  Each contingency scenario results in a 
unique consequence.   
RSj Contingency 1 Contingency 2 Conseqeunce
RS1 1 1 Consequence Contingency Event 1 + Consequence Contingency Event 2
RS2 1 0 Consequence Contingency Event 1 +                              0
RS3 0 1                               0                           + Consequence Contingency Event 2
RS4 0 0                               0                           +                              0
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 Since each contingency event is composed of a set of contingency scenarios, a 
contingency event possesses a discrete distribution of consequences.  It is these 
distributions that must be added together to calculate the consequence of a risk scenario.  
Discussion of methods to combine distributions of consequences is postponed until 
Section 3.5.  First, a method to derive the distribution of consequences for a single 
contingency event is presented.  
3.4 Evaluating the Consequence of a Contingency Event 
 This procedure is analogous to assessing the risk of a decision alternative.  First, 
the scenarios that describe the potential states of nature are generated; second, the 
likelihood of each scenario is computed; and finally, the consequence of each scenario is 
estimated. 
3.4.1 Generating Contingency Scenarios  
 Contingency scenarios represent the set of events that can ‘go wrong’ given a 
contingency event.  The natural partition of contingency scenarios is on the set of actual 
events that could occur.  Partitioned in this way, however, the set of potential scenarios is 
large and consequently burdensome to generate.   
 Consider instead partitioning on the possible levels of capability required by the 
contingency and the possible levels of capability available from the host nation.  With 
respect to the realization of adverse consequences, these factors represent all the pertinent 
information contained in the actual events because it is the differential between these 
capability levels that initiates adverse consequences.   
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 Consequently, a contingency scenario is composed of three elements.  The level 
of capability required by the contingency is represented by a requirement scenario.  The 
level of capability available from the host nation is represented jointly by procurement 
and implementation scenarios.  Procurement scenarios represent the level of capability 
procured and maintained by the host nation.  Implementation scenarios represent whether 
or not the host nation will actually implement the capability it has procured.  Each unique 
combination of requirement, procurement and implementation scenario forms a 
contingency scenario.  Contingency scenarios for a single notional contingency event are 
shown hierarchically in the event tree in Figure 3.3. 
 
Figure 3.3 Contingency Tree 
RSHigh
RSMed
RSLow
PSHigh
PSMed
PSLow
PSHigh
PSMed
PSLow
PSHigh
PSMed
PSLow
PSHigh
PSMed
PSLow
PSHigh
PSMed
PSLow
PSHigh
PSMed
PSLow
ISFull
ISNone
ISFull
ISNone
ISFull
ISNone
RS
IS
PS
IS
IS
PS
PS
PS
PS
PS
CS1
CS2
CS3
CS4
CS5
CS6
CS7
CS8
CS9
CS10
CS11
CS12
CS13
CS14
CS15
CS16
CS17
CS18
 39
 
3.4.1.1 Procurement and Requirement Scenarios 
 Next, a method to explicitly define the levels of capability through which 
requirement and procurement scenarios are defined is presented.  Conceptually, a 
capability can be decomposed into a finite set of measurable factors considered in 
evaluating the efficacy of that capability.  A particular realization of the possible states of 
these measures is termed a capability scenario and corresponds to a particular level of 
capability.   
 In order to ensure that capability scenarios are mutually exclusive, each state 
under a measure is interpreted as the best value that can be achieved under that measure.  
In order to ensure that the capability state-space is finite, the scale of each measure is 
partitioned into ri discrete bins.  The thresholds partitioning the bins are determined by 
subject matter experts and the number of bins is driven by the required fidelity of the 
assessment.  With q measures and ri states possible under each measure, 
1
q
i
i
r
=
∏ capability 
scenarios are possible. Decomposition of a capability into q measures, each with ri 
discrete states is illustrated hierarchically in Figure 3.4.    
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Figure 3.4 Measures of a Capability 
 
 A notional set of capability scenarios assuming three measures, each with two 
states, is presented in Table 3.5.  Because the states of the evaluation considerations are 
mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive, the capability scenarios cover the entire 
capability space and represent every possible level of capability. 
Table 3.5 Capability Scenarios 
 
 
 
 Since the number capability scenarios increases exponentially with the number of 
evaluation considerations, the number of scenarios quickly becomes intractable.  In order 
Capability Scenario Measure 1 Measure 2 Measure 3
CBS1 State 1 State 1 State 1
CBS2 State 1 State 1 State 0
CBS3 State 1 State 0 State 1
CBS4 State 1 State 0 State 0
CBS5 State 0 State 1 State 1
CBS6 State 0 State 1 State 0
CBS7 State 0 State 0 State 1
CBS8 State 0 State 0 State 0
Capability
Measure 1 Measure 2 Measure q
State 1
State r1
State 1
State r2
State 1
State rq
…
… … …… … …
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to decrease the capability state-space to a more reasonable level, the scenarios can be 
aggregated into classes that provide equivalent levels of capability.  The number of 
classes and assignment to classes is qualitative and is based on the opinion of subject 
matter experts.  A notional partition is shown in Table 3.6. 
Table 3.6 Partitioned Capability Scenarios 
 
 
 
 The requirement and procurement scenarios are now specified by these classes of 
capability.  For example, consider contingency scenario one (CS1) in Figure 3.3.  RShigh 
denotes that the contingency event requires a high level of capability.  Similarly, PShigh 
denotes that the host nation has procured/maintained a high level of capability.     
 Once the procurement and requirement scenarios are specified, the likelihood of 
each scenario can be assessed by subject matter experts.  Likelihoods for requirement 
scenarios are dependent on the contingency event and likelihoods for procurement 
scenarios are dependent on the decision alternative.  Notional procurement and 
requirement scenarios and their likelihoods are presented in Tables 3.7 and 3.8. 
Capability Scenario Capability Level
CBS1 High
CBS2 Medium
CBS3 Medium
CBS4 Low
CBS5 Medium 
CBS6 Low 
CBS7 Low
CBS8 Low
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Table 3.7 Notional Procurement Scenarios 
 
Table 3.8 Notional Requirement Scenarios 
 
3.4.1.2 Implementation Scenarios 
 Even though a nation has procured and maintained a capability adequately, it may 
not necessarily employ it.  Non-implementation may occur because of potential conflicts 
of interest between the host nation and the nations involved with the contingency or 
because the host nation is using the capability in another contingency.   These events are 
accounted for by the implementation scenarios.  An implementation scenario denotes 
whether or not the host nation implements its procured capability.  At the individual 
contingency level it is assumed that only two implementation scenarios are possible: full 
implementation or no implementation.    
 Likelihoods for each implementation scenario can be assessed by subject matter 
experts and are dependent on the particular capability, the contingency and the decision 
alternative.  Notional implementation scenarios and their likelihoods are presented in 
Table 3.9. 
Procurment Scenario Capability Level Likelihood
PS1 High 0.60
PS2 Medium 0.20
PS3 Low 0.20
Requirement Scenairo Capability Level Likelihood
RS1 High 0.20
RS2 Medium 0.45
RS3 Low 0.35
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Table 3.9 Implementation Scenarios 
 
3.4.2 Calculating the Likelihood of Contingency Scenarios 
 The likelihood of a complete contingency scenario is calculated by taking the 
product of the likelihoods of each scenario that composes it.  Since implementation 
scenarios are dependent on the decision alternative and the contingency, their likelihoods 
must be conditional on both factors. 
3.4.3 Assessing Consequences of Contingency Scenarios 
 Once the set of contingency scenarios is enumerated, consequences must be 
assigned to each scenario.  Logic dictates that consequences need only be assessed for 
contingency scenarios in which the required capability level exceeds the available 
capability level.  Conversely, contingency scenarios in which the available capability 
level exceeds or is equivalent to the required capability level are assumed to have no 
adverse consequence. 
 In the context of capability divestiture, multiple risk factors are necessary to 
completely characterize a decision alternative.  Risk factors represent the types of 
consequence that a risk scenario may produce. As an example, risk factors about which a 
decision maker may be concerned in the context of capability divestiture are 
friendly/allied casualties, timeliness of desired effects and post conflict recovery time.  
 The purpose of this phase of the methodology is to assign a consequence to each 
risk factor for every contingency scenario. Unfortunately, the consequence of a 
Implementation Scenario Description Likelihood
IS1 Implement capability 0.6
IS2 Do not implement capability 0.4
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contingency scenario in the context of capability divestiture is not explicitly prescribed. 
Consequently, the assignment of consequences to a risk scenario must be subjective. The 
decomposition of contingency scenarios into requirement, procurement and 
implementation scenarios was done intentionally to provide some degree of objectivity to 
the consequence assessment process.  The difference between the required and procured 
levels of capability for each contingency scenario offers insight into the magnitude of the 
consequence of the contingency scenario.  Ultimately, however, the assignment of 
consequences is subjective and consequence assessment is based on the judgment of 
subject matter experts.  
 The result of this process is a discrete distribution of consequences for each risk 
factor for a contingency event.  These distributions must be added appropriately to 
compute the consequence of a risk scenario.  This process is discussed in the subsequent 
section. 
3.5 Computing the Consequence of a Risk Scenario 
 The consequence of a risk scenario is computed by summing the consequences of 
its constituent contingency events.  This is problematic, however, since each contingency 
event possesses a distribution of consequences under each risk factor.   
 This condition can be handled in two ways.  First, the distributions of each 
constituent contingency event could be convolved to derive a single distribution of 
consequence.  However, this process can easily become overwhelming as the number of 
contingencies grows.   
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 A less sophisticated but more tractable method is to simply parameterize each 
distribution of consequence.  This can be accomplished by measuring the distribution by 
taking its conditional expected consequence. The conditional expected consequence is 
ideal for this purpose because it accounts for the severe consequences about which 
decision makers are typically concerned.  Traditionally, the conditional expected 
consequence is defined for continuous functions; however, the distribution of 
consequence for each contingency event is discrete.  Consequently, the measure is 
defined as | ( )
| ( )
( )
[ | ( ) ]
( )
X P X
X P X
x p x
E X P X
p x
α
α
α ≥
≥
∗
≥ =
∑
∑ , where X represents the discrete random 
consequence andα  represents the desired probability of exceedance.  The conditional 
expected consequence for the notional distribution of consequence in Table 3.10 is 
presented below.   
Table 3.10 Distribution of Consequence for Contingency Event 1 
 
 
CS L X
CS1 0.20 1000
CS2 0.20 900
CS3 0.30 500
CS4 0.30 100
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 Once the distribution of consequences for each contingency event is transformed 
into a scalar via measurement under conditional expectation, the consequence of a risk 
scenario can be computed by simply adding the measures corresponding to the 
appropriate contingency events.  Given the conditional expectations for notional 
contingencies one and two presented in Table 3.11, the resulting consequence for each 
risk scenario is presented in table 3.12.   
Table 3.11 Conditional Expectations 
 
Contingency E[X|P(X)>.90]
C1 1000
C2 5000
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Table 3.12 Risk 
 
3.6 Measuring Risk 
 Once the risk of each decision alternative is quantified it may be useful to 
measure the risk.  The conditional expected consequence can also be  used as a measure 
of risk in this context.  In the following example, the conditional expected consequence is 
calculated for the risk presented in Table 3.12 using the likelihoods presented in Table 
3.3.   
 
Risk Scenario Contingency 1 Contingency 2 Consequence
RS1 1 1 1000 + 5000 = 6000
RS2 1 0 1000 +     0    = 1000
RS3 0 1     0    + 5000 = 5000
RS4 0 0     0    +   0      =      0
 48
 
| ( )
| ( )
| ( ) .8
| ( ) .8
( )
[ | ( ) ]
( )
( )
[ | ( ) .9]
( )
6000 .03[ | ( ) .9]
.03
[ | ( ) .9] 6000
X P X
X P X
X P X
X P X
x p x
E X P X
p x
x p x
E X P X
p x
E X P X
E X P X
α
α
α ≥
≥
≥
≥
∗
≥ =
∗
≥ =
∗≥ =
≥ =
∑
∑
∑
∑
 
3.7 Summary 
 This chapter provided a methodology to generate the risk of the decision 
alternatives in the decision to divest a military capability to an allied nation.  This was 
accomplished by defining risk scenarios in terms of contingencies and calculating the 
consequence of each risk scenario additively as the sum of the consequence of each 
constituent contingency event.   
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4 Results and Analysis 
4.1 Introduction 
 This chapter applies the risk assessment methodology presented in Chapter 3 to 
the decision to divest the Air Force capability Tactical Surveillance of Mobile Terrestrial 
Targets to an allied nation.  This example accomplishes three tasks.  First, it generates the 
set of risk scenarios, likelihoods and consequences that define the risk of divesting the 
capability.  Second, it measures the risk of divestiture via the conditional expected 
consequence operator.  Finally, it investigates which scenarios are the most significant 
contributors of risk and how the risk can be mitigated if these scenarios are managed by 
the decision maker. 
 Like any risk assessment methodology, this process is dependent on data provided 
by subject matter experts.  This data includes estimates of the likelihoods and 
consequences of the risk scenarios and the contingencies of concern.  Since subject 
matter experts were not available for solicitation of data, notional data provided by the 
author is considered instead.  The complete set of notional data used in this chapter is 
presented in the Appendix.  
4.2 Choosing a Capability 
 This chapter examines the risk of divesting the Air Force service-level capability 
Tactical Surveillance of Mobile Terrestrial Targets (Johnson, 2005:13).  Two questions 
are of immediate concern.  First, which specific elements of the capability are considered 
for divestiture?  Second, how does the capability map to the JCA/UJTL framework?   
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 First, the capability must be decomposed further into its constituent elements.  
According to a study conducted by former Under Secretary of the Air force for 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Pete Aldridge, a capability can be decomposed 
into seven standard elements: doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, 
personnel and facilities (Department of Defense, 2003: Chapter1, 2).  In this example, all 
seven elements of the capability Tactical Surveillance of Mobile Terrestrial Targets will 
be divested.  Conceivably, however, any combination of these elements of the capability 
could be divested.  This is directly manifested in the methodology through the subject 
matter expert’s assessment of the consequence of a contingency scenario.  For a given 
contingency scenario, the more elements of a capability that are divested, the greater the 
consequence may be.   
 Mapping the capability to the JCA framework is considered next.  How does the 
Air Force service-level capability Tactical Surveillance of Mobile Terrestrial Targets 
impact the hierarchy itself.  Because of the structure of the JCA/UJTL framework, a 
single service-level capability could appear in multiple UJTL tasks.  Subsequently, 
multiple UJTL tasks could appear in multiple operational templates, multiple operational 
templates could occur in multiple JCAs, multiple JCAs could be required for multiple 
operations and multiple operations will likely be necessary for a particular contingency.  
This structure is shown notionally in the Figure 4.1.   
 51
 
Figure 4.1 JCA/UJTL Structure 
 
 The result of this structure is that a single service level capability, like Tactical 
Surveillance of Mobile Terrestrial Targets, can have a cumulative effect through 
JCA/UJTL hierarchy, appearing multiple times at the operational level.  This is precisely 
why it is critical to evaluate the risk of divesting a military capability. 
4.2.1 Focus on Threats 
 One of the objectives of capabilities based planning (CBP) is to make decisions 
and plans independent of threats.  While this objective can be realized in many areas of 
planning, in order to formally assess risk, of which consequence and likelihood are 
fundamental components, threats must be considered.  Threats are an integral part of the 
risk scenario because the consequence and likelihood of a risk scenario are only realized 
in the context of a specified threat.  Since likelihood and consequence are fundamental to 
Operation 1 Operation 2 Operation 3 Operation 4 Operation 5
UJTL Task 1
UJTL Op Temp 1 
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Tactical Surveillance of Mobile 
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defining risk, threats are a necessary component of a comprehensive risk assessment 
process. 
    Consider divesting a capability.  What is the consequence?  Obviously, this 
question depends on the threat.  If there is no threat then no adverse consequence is 
realized.  Conversely, if the capability required to meet the threat exceeds the available 
capability then adverse consequences are realized. The consequences cannot be 
adequately assessed without considering a threat.   Certainly one could simply estimate 
the worst possible consequences of a certain capability scenario, but even this implies an 
assumed worst-case threat scenario.  And even in this case, risk cannot be properly 
defined because the implied threat does not possess an explicit likelihood.    Therefore, 
the inclusion of threat is absolutely necessary to define the risk of divesting a military 
capability.    
4.3 Contingencies 
 Contingencies represent events that require the United States to use the Air Force 
service-level capability Tactical Surveillance of Mobile Terrestrial Targets.  Six notional 
contingencies about which decision makers are concerned are listed in Table 4.1, along 
with their respective likelihoods of occurrence.   
Table 4.1 Notional Contingencies and Likelihoods 
 
Contingency i Description L(Occurrence) L(Non-Occurrence)
1 Major Regional Conflict in Raetia 0.01 0.99
2 Major regional conflict in Noricum 0.05 0.95
3 Humanitarian Assisstance in Dacia 0.20 0.80
4 Small Scale Conflict in Lycia 0.25 0.75
5 Small Scale Conflict in Numidia 0.50 0.50
6 Stability Operations in Baetica 0.10 0.90
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4.4 Risk Scenarios and Likelihoods 
 Risk scenarios are formed by enumerating each possible combination of 
contingencies.  Six contingencies result in 26= 64 unique risk scenarios.  The likelihood 
of each risk scenario is calculated as the product of the likelihoods of the contingency 
events that compose it.  The calculation of the likelihood of risk scenario one, in which 
all six contingencies occur, is shown below.  It is calculated as the product of the 
likelihood of occurrence of each constituent contingency. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 61
1
1
L(RS ) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1)
L(RS ) .01 .05 * .20 * .25 * .50 * .10
L(RS ) 1.25E-06
C C C C C CL L L L L L= ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
= ∗
=
 
          In Table 4.2, the likelihoods for the remaining risk scenarios are presented. A “1” 
signifies that contingency i occurs and a “0” signifies that contingency i does not occur.   
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Table 4.2 Risk Scenarios 
 
RSj 1 2 3 4 5 6 Likelihood
RS1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.00000125
RS2 1 1 1 1 1 0 0.00001125
RS3 1 1 1 1 0 1 0.00000125
RS4 1 1 1 1 0 0 0.00001125
RS5 1 1 1 0 1 1 0.00000375
RS6 1 1 1 0 1 0 0.00003375
RS7 1 1 1 0 0 1 0.00000375
RS8 1 1 1 0 0 0 0.00003375
RS9 1 1 0 1 1 1 0.000005
RS10 1 1 0 1 1 0 0.000045
RS11 1 1 0 1 0 1 0.000005
RS12 1 1 0 1 0 0 0.000045
RS13 1 1 0 0 1 1 0.000015
RS14 1 1 0 0 1 0 0.000135
RS15 1 1 0 0 0 1 0.000015
RS16 1 1 0 0 0 0 0.000135
RS17 1 0 1 1 1 1 0.00002375
RS18 1 0 1 1 1 0 0.00021375
RS19 1 0 1 1 0 1 0.00002375
RS20 1 0 1 1 0 0 0.00021375
RS21 1 0 1 0 1 1 0.00007125
RS22 1 0 1 0 1 0 0.00064125
RS23 1 0 1 0 0 1 0.00007125
RS24 1 0 1 0 0 0 0.00064125
RS25 1 0 0 1 1 1 0.000095
RS26 1 0 0 1 1 0 0.000855
RS27 1 0 0 1 0 1 0.000095
RS28 1 0 0 1 0 0 0.000855
RS29 1 0 0 0 1 1 0.000285
RS30 1 0 0 0 1 0 0.002565
RS31 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.000285
RS32 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.002565
Contingency
RSj 1 2 3 4 5 6 Likelihood
RS33 0 1 1 1 1 1 0.00012375
RS34 0 1 1 1 1 0 0.00111375
RS35 0 1 1 1 0 1 0.00012375
RS36 0 1 1 1 0 0 0.00111375
RS37 0 1 1 0 1 1 0.00037125
RS38 0 1 1 0 1 0 0.00334125
RS39 0 1 1 0 0 1 0.00037125
RS40 0 1 1 0 0 0 0.00334125
RS41 0 1 0 1 1 1 0.000495
RS42 0 1 0 1 1 0 0.004455
RS43 0 1 0 1 0 1 0.000495
RS44 0 1 0 1 0 0 0.004455
RS45 0 1 0 0 1 1 0.001485
RS46 0 1 0 0 1 0 0.013365
RS47 0 1 0 0 0 1 0.001485
RS48 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.013365
RS49 0 0 1 1 1 1 0.00235125
RS50 0 0 1 1 1 0 0.02116125
RS51 0 0 1 1 0 1 0.00235125
RS52 0 0 1 1 0 0 0.02116125
RS53 0 0 1 0 1 1 0.00705375
RS54 0 0 1 0 1 0 0.06348375
RS55 0 0 1 0 0 1 0.00705375
RS56 0 0 1 0 0 0 0.06348375
RS57 0 0 0 1 1 1 0.009405
RS58 0 0 0 1 1 0 0.084645
RS59 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.009405
RS60 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.084645
RS61 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.028215
RS62 0 0 0 0 1 0 0.253935
RS63 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.028215
RS64 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.253935
Contingency
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4.5 Defining Capability Levels 
 The levels of capability used to characterize procurement and requirement 
scenarios must be explicitly defined in order to assess consequence. This requires a 
subject matter expert to define a comprehensive set of measures for Tactical Surveillance 
of Mobile Terrestrial Targets.  A notional set of measures and the states possible under 
each measure is presented in Figure 4.2 (Johnson, 2005: 13).  
 
Figure 4.2 Capability Measures 
 
 All possible combinations of the states of the measure are enumerated to generate 
capability scenarios which define the possible levels of capability.  These scenarios are 
shown in the Table 4.3 where the number under each measure represents the state of the 
capability under that measure. 
Tactical Surveillance 
of Mobile Terrestrial 
Targets
Velocity of mobile 
terrestrial targets Target Resolution 
Number of 
Simultaneous 
Targets 
Probability of 
Detection 
> 10 kph
<= 10 kph
< 1 m
>=1 m, <10 m
> 25
<= 25
> .8
<= .8
>= 10 m
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Table 4.3 Capability Scenarios 
 
 
 Next, subject matter experts group capability scenarios into classes with roughly 
equivalent levels of capability.  In this example, capability scenarios are partitioned into 
three classes of capability: high, medium and low.  A notional partition is shown in the 
Table 4.4. 
Capability Scenario Measure 1 Measure 2 Measure 3 Measure 4
CBS1 1 1 1 1
CBS2 1 1 1 2
CBS3 1 1 2 1
CBS4 1 1 2 2
CBS5 2 1 1 1
CBS6 2 1 1 2
CBS7 2 1 2 1
CBS8 2 1 2 2
CBS9 1 2 1 1
CBS10 1 2 1 2
CBS11 1 2 2 1
CBS12 1 2 2 2
CBS13 2 2 1 1
CBS14 2 2 1 2
CBS15 2 2 2 1
CBS16 2 2 2 2
CBS17 1 3 1 1
CBS18 1 3 1 2
CBS19 1 3 2 1
CBS20 1 3 2 2
CBS21 2 3 1 1
CBS22 2 3 1 2
CBS23 2 3 2 1
CBS24 2 3 2 2
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Table 4.4 Partition of Capability Scenarios 
 
4.6 Evaluating a Contingency Event 
 Next, the risk of each contingency event is assessed.  Evaluation of a contingency 
event requires substantial input from subject matter experts.  In particular, subject matter 
experts must specify the likelihood of each possible requirement, implementation and 
procurement scenario, along with the consequence of each contingency scenario that they 
compose.  Notional data for a single contingency event is presented in Tables 4.5 and 4.6. 
 
 
   
Capability Level Capability Scenario Measure 1 Measure 2 Measure 3 Measure 4
CBS1 1 1 1 1
CBS2 1 1 1 2
CBS3 1 1 2 1
CBS5 2 1 1 1
CBS9 1 2 1 1
CBS4 1 1 2 2
CBS6 2 1 1 2
CBS7 2 1 2 1
CBS10 1 2 1 2
CBS11 1 2 2 1
CBS13 2 2 1 1
CBS15 2 2 2 1
CBS17 1 3 1 1
CBS18 1 3 1 2
CBS19 1 3 2 1
CBS21 2 3 1 1
CBS8 2 1 2 2
CBS12 1 2 2 2
CBS14 2 2 1 2
CBS16 2 2 2 2
CBS20 1 3 2 2
CBS22 2 3 1 2
CBS23 2 3 2 1
CBS24 2 3 2 2
High
Med
Low
 58
Table 4.5 Notional Likelihoods 
 
 
Table 4.6 Notional Contingency Scenarios 
 
IS Likelihood
ISfull 0.90
ISnone 0.10
PS Likelihood
PShigh 0.80
PSmed 0.10
PSlow 0.10
RS Likelihood
RShigh 0.20
RSmed 0.20
RSlow 0.60
CSj IS RS PS Likelihood Consequence
CS1 ISfull RShigh PShigh 0.1440 0
CS2 ISfull RShigh PSmed 0.0180 5
CS3 ISfull RShigh PSlow 0.0180 6
CS4 ISnone RShigh PShigh 0.0160 10
CS5 ISnone RShigh PSmed 0.0020 10
CS6 ISnone RShigh PSlow 0.0020 10
CS7 ISfull RSmed PShigh 0.1440 0
CS8 ISfull RSmed PSmed 0.0180 0
CS9 ISfull RSmed PSlow 0.0180 5
CS10 ISnone RSmed PShigh 0.0160 8
CS11 ISnone RSmed PSmed 0.0020 8
CS12 ISnone RSmed PSlow 0.0020 8
CS13 ISfull RSlow PShigh 0.4320 0
CS14 ISfull RSlow PSmed 0.0540 0
CS15 ISfull RSlow PSlow 0.0540 0
CS16 ISnone RSlow PShigh 0.0480 3
CS17 ISnone RSlow PSmed 0.0060 3
CS18 ISnone RSlow PSlow 0.0060 3
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4.7 Measuring the Consequences of Each Contingency Event 
 Once the distribution of consequences for each contingency event is generated, it 
is measured by taking its conditional expected consequence.  The following example 
computes the conditional expected consequence of the data presented in Table 4.6.  In 
this example, the specified condition is that the cumulative likelihood of the consequence 
exceeds .9.  The conditional expectations of the remaining contingency scenarios are 
presented in the Table 4.7.   
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Table 4.7 Contingency Consequences 
 
4.8 Resulting Data 
 Next, the consequence of a risk scenario is computed as the sum of the 
consequences of the appropriate contingency events.  The consequence of risk scenario 
one is computed below. In this scenario all of the contingency events occur.  
Consequences for the remaining scenarios are shown in the Table 4.8. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 61
1
1
( ) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1)
( ) 444 1000 7 100 150 25
( ) 1726
C C C C C CCon RS Con Con Con Con Con Con
Con RS
Con RS
= + + + + +
= + + + + +
=
 
  
Contingency i Description E[X|P(X)>=.9]
1 Major Regional Conflict in Raetia 444
2 Major regional conflict in Noricum 1000
3 Humanitarian Assisstance in Dacia 7
4 Small Scale Conflict in Lycia 100
5 Small Scale Conflict in Numidia 150
6 Stability Operations in Baetica 25
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Table 4.8 Risk 
 
RSj Likelihood Conseqeunce
RS1 0.00000125 1726
RS2 0.00001125 1701
RS3 0.00000125 1576
RS4 0.00001125 1551
RS5 0.00000375 1626
RS6 0.00003375 1601
RS7 0.00000375 1476
RS8 0.00003375 1451
RS9 0.000005 1719
RS10 0.000045 1694
RS11 0.000005 1569
RS12 0.000045 1544
RS13 0.000015 1619
RS14 0.000135 1594
RS15 0.000015 1469
RS16 0.000135 1444
RS17 0.00002375 726
RS18 0.00021375 701
RS19 0.00002375 576
RS20 0.00021375 551
RS21 0.00007125 626
RS22 0.00064125 601
RS23 0.00007125 476
RS24 0.00064125 451
RS25 0.000095 719
RS26 0.000855 694
RS27 0.000095 569
RS28 0.000855 544
RS29 0.000285 619
RS30 0.002565 594
RS31 0.000285 469
RS32 0.002565 444
RSj Likelihood Conseqeunce
RS33 0.00012375 1281
RS34 0.00111375 1257
RS35 0.00012375 1131
RS36 0.00111375 1107
RS37 0.00037125 1181
RS38 0.00334125 1157
RS39 0.00037125 1031
RS40 0.00334125 1007
RS41 0.000495 1275
RS42 0.004455 1250
RS43 0.000495 1125
RS44 0.004455 1100
RS45 0.001485 1175
RS46 0.013365 1150
RS47 0.001485 1025
RS48 0.013365 1000
RS49 0.00235125 281
RS50 0.02116125 257
RS51 0.00235125 131
RS52 0.02116125 107
RS53 0.00705375 181
RS54 0.06348375 157
RS55 0.00705375 31
RS56 0.06348375 7
RS57 0.009405 275
RS58 0.084645 250
RS59 0.009405 125
RS60 0.084645 100
RS61 0.028215 175
RS62 0.253935 150
RS63 0.028215 25
RS64 0.253935 0
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4.9 Analysis 
 The methodology provides the distribution of consequences possible from 
divesting a military capability to an allied nation.  The next logical question is how this 
information might be employed by a decision maker.   
4.9.1 Traditional Decision Context 
 First, in order to make a decision, a decision maker could compare the probability 
of exceedance curves of each decision alternative.  A probability of exceedance curve 
shows the cumulative likelihood that a consequence will exceed a specified value.  The 
exceedance curve for the alternative to divest Tactical Surveillance of Mobile Terrestrial 
Targets is shown in Figure 4.3.   
 
Figure 4.3 Probability of Exceedance Curve 
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 If the cumulative likelihood of every consequence of a particular decision 
alternative is less or equally likely than every consequence of another alternative, then the 
first alternative is said to be stochastically dominant over the second.  If a decision 
alternative is dominant over another alternative then the dominating alternative is 
preferred. If the conditions for dominance are violated then other methods for ranking the 
decision alternatives are necessary, in this case, evaluation under a utility model.  
Additionally, if multiple risk factors are considered, a multi-attribute utility model is 
necessary to rank the alternatives 
 A second technique for ranking alternatives is to compare risk measures.  For this 
application, risk can be measured using the conditional expected consequence presented 
in Section 4.7 or using the other measures as outlined in Section 2.4.3.  Conditional 
expected consequence is often considered an adequate measure of risk because it 
accounts for the most extreme events possible in a distribution.  The expectation and two 
conditional expectations for the data in Table 4.8 are presented in Table 4.9. 
Table 4.9 Unmitigated Measures of Risk 
 
4.10 Post Decision Analysis 
 Once a decision maker has chosen a decision alternative, he may be interested in 
reducing the risk associated with that alternative.  Because of the structure of the 
methodology, the relevant question is not which risk scenarios are of most concern but 
which contingency events are of most concern.  
E[X] 158
E[X|P(X) >=.75] 455
E[X|P(X) >=.90] 750
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  Upon examining the likelihoods and consequences of the contingency events, 
two stand out: Contingency 2, which has the highest conditional expected consequence, 
and Contingency 5, which has the highest likelihood.  These contingencies are presented 
in the following table. 
Table 4.10 Contingencies of Concern 
 
  
 Contingency 2 is examined first.  Why does Contingency 2 produce such severe 
consequences?  To answer this question it is necessary to examine its constituent 
contingency scenarios.  The largest consequences under Contingency 2 result from the 
scenarios in which the capability is not implemented.  These scenarios are presented 
below. 
Contingency i Description L(Occurrence) L(Non-Occurrence) E[X|P(X) >=.9]
1 Major Regional Conflict in Raetia 0.01 0.99 444
2 Major regional conflict in Noricum 0.05 0.95 1000
3 Humanitarian Assisstance in Dacia 0.20 0.80 7
4 Small Scale Conflict in Lycia 0.25 0.75 100
5 Small Scale Conflict in Numidia 0.50 0.50 150
6 Stability Operations in Baetica 0.10 0.90 25
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Table 4.11 Contingency Events of Concern 
 
  
 In this context, risk can be mitigated if the decision maker can ensure that the host 
nation will implement its capability if Contingency 2 occurs.  Assuming this can be 
guaranteed (which implies the likelihood of full implementation equals one), the measure 
of risk for Contingency 2 falls from 1000 to 378.  The resulting overall measures of risk 
are presented in Table 4.12.  All three measures of risk have decreased significantly, 
particularly the conditional expectations. 
Table 4.12 Mitigation Option 1 
 
CSj IS RS PS Likelihood Consequence
CS1 ISfull RShigh PShigh 0.5120 0
CS2 ISfull RShigh PSmed 0.0640 150
CS3 ISfull RShigh PSlow 0.0640 400
CS4 ISnone RShigh PShigh 0.1280 1000
CS5 ISnone RShigh PSmed 0.0160 1000
CS6 ISnone RShigh PSlow 0.0160 1000
CS7 ISfull RSmed PShigh 0.0640 0
CS8 ISfull RSmed PSmed 0.0080 0
CS9 ISfull RSmed PSlow 0.0080 200
CS10 ISnone RSmed PShigh 0.0160 600
CS11 ISnone RSmed PSmed 0.0020 600
CS12 ISnone RSmed PSlow 0.0020 600
CS13 ISfull RSlow PShigh 0.0640 0
CS14 ISfull RSlow PSmed 0.0080 0
CS15 ISfull RSlow PSlow 0.0080 0
CS16 ISnone RSlow PShigh 0.0160 100
CS17 ISnone RSlow PSmed 0.0020 100
CS18 ISnone RSlow PSlow 0.0020 100
E[X] 127
E[X|P(X) >=.75] 309
E[X|P(X) >=.90] 413
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 Next, consider Contingency 5.  Recall, Contingency 5 is of concern because of its 
high likelihood of occurrence.  The decision maker may be interested in the effect on the 
risk of divestiture if the contingency could be avoided entirely.  Assuming the U.S. can 
take actions that result in the likelihood of Contingency 5 being negligible (i.e., its 
likelihood of occurrence equals .01); the resulting measures of risk are presented in Table 
4.13. 
Table 4.13 Mitigation Option 2 
 
 
 Both mitigation options are presented along with the no mitigation option in the 
following table. 
Table 4.14 Results 
 
4.11 Summary 
 This chapter applied the risk assessment methodology presented Chapter 3 to the 
decision to divest the Air Force capability Tactical Surveillance of Mobile Terrestrial 
Targets to an allied nation.  First, it generated the set of risk scenarios, likelihoods and 
consequences that define the risk of divesting the capability.  Second, it measured the risk 
of divestiture via the conditional expected consequence operator.  Finally, it investigated 
which scenarios were the most significant contributors of risk and conducted a sensitivity 
E[X] 85
E[X|P(X) >=.75] 487
E[X|P(X) >=.90] 660
Mit Optn Description E[X] E[X|P(X) >=.75] E[X|P(X) >=.90]
0 No Mitigation 158 455 750
1 Ensuring Implementation in Contingency 2 127 309 413
2 Avoiding Contingency 5 85 487 660
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analysis to evaluate how the measures of risk change if these scenarios can be managed 
by the decision maker. 
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5 Conclusion 
5.1 Summary 
 This thesis provided a tractable methodology to identify the three elements (i.e., 
risk scenarios, likelihoods and consequences) that define the risk of each decision 
alternative in the decision to divest a military capability to an allied nation.   
 In this methodology, risk scenarios are defined as combinations of contingencies 
that require the capability considered for divestiture.  The likelihood of each risk scenario 
is calculated as the product of the likelihood of the contingency events that compose it.   
 The consequence of each risk scenario is defined as the sum of the consequences 
of the contingency events that compose it.  Each contingency event, however, possesses a 
distribution of consequences.  To facilitate assessment of the distribution of 
consequences, each contingency event is decomposed into a set of contingency scenarios.  
Each contingency scenario is defined by an available and required capability level.  
Levels of capability are defined by the states a capability can possibly take on under a set 
of measures defined by subject matter experts.  Each contingency scenario produces a 
unique consequence that can be estimated by subject matter experts based on the 
differential in the required and available capability levels.   
 In order to construct the consequence of each risk scenario, the consequence of 
each contingency event must be combined.  This requires collapsing the distribution of 
consequences of each contingency event into a representative measure for which addition 
is defined.   This measure should be chosen carefully so that the most extreme 
consequences are accounted for.   An appropriate measure for this task is the conditional 
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expected consequence.  This measure calculates the expected consequence given that the 
consequence exceeds a specified threshold.  
  Once the distribution of each contingency event has been measured, the measures 
are added appropriately to construct the consequence of each risk scenario.  This process 
results in a complete set of risk scenarios, likelihoods and consequences for each decision 
alternative.   
 Next, this information is applied to the decision process.  If a decision maker has 
not yet made a decision, the risk of each decision alternative can provide input to the 
decision process via several mechanisms.  First, exceedance curves for alternatives can be 
compared; second, the distributions of consequence can be evaluated in a utility model; 
finally, the risk can be used as a decision attribute.  The conditional expected 
consequence was proposed as an adequate measure of risk in this context.  If the decision 
maker has already chosen a decision alternative, sensitivity analysis on the risk 
calculations can be used to determine the most significant contributors to risk.  This 
knowledge then drives risk mitigation options that can be evaluated under the proposed 
methodology. 
5.2 Methodology Improvements 
 There are several aspects of the methodology that could be improved by further 
study.  First, methods to combine expert opinion and available information to produce 
more accurate assessments of likelihood and consequence should be explored.  Second, 
alternative decompositions of contingency events should be examined to determine the 
optimal level of resolution necessary to elicit accurate assessments of consequence. 
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5.2.1 Objectivity of Inputs 
 Every risk assessment methodology is dependent on the accuracy of its inputs. In 
the context of capability divestiture, these inputs are highly subjective because many of 
the risk scenarios have never before been realized.  Consequently, frequency data cannot 
be used to estimate the likelihoods of risk scenarios nor can historical data be used to 
directly assess the consequences of risk scenarios. 
 Ideally, however, the inputs to a risk assessment should be objective.  In order to 
obtain a more robust estimate of the likelihood of a risk scenario, several authors have 
suggested methods based on Bayes’ theorem to fuse all available information and 
produce more accurate assessments of both likelihood and consequence. Incorporation of 
this technique into the methodology could produce more accurate assessments of risk.  
5.2.2 Decomposition of Contingency Events  
 Alternative decompositions of contingency events should also be explored.  
Conceptually, an inverse relationship exists between the tractability of a risk assessment 
methodology and its accuracy.  A methodology that facilitates the most accurate 
assessments of consequence necessarily requires the most specific risk scenarios, and is 
consequently less practical to construct.  Conversely, a tractable methodology is tractable 
precisely because the resolution of its risk scenarios is low. 
 The intent of this thesis was to decompose a contingency event generically, so 
that the decomposition is not dependent on the specific capability, yet in a manner that 
still provides enough resolution to a potential subject matter expert to facilitate an 
accurate assessment of consequence.  However, in practice this partition is likely too 
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coarse for a subject matter expert to accurately assess consequences.  Decompositions 
using Haimes’ HHM or Kaplan’s TSS may result in more detailed contingency scenarios 
that facilitate more accurate assessment of consequence.   
 72
Appendix 
 The notional data used in Chapter 4 is presented in the Appendix.  Baseline 
likelihoods and consequences are presented in Tables A.1 and A.2.  The revised risk for 
mitigation option one is presented in table A.3.  The revised risk for mitigation option 
two is presented in table A.4 
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Table A.1 Baseline Scenario Likelihoods 
 
 
RS Likelihood RS Likelihood RS Likelihood
RShigh 0.70 RShigh 0.80 RShigh 0.20
RSmed 0.20 RSmed 0.10 RSmed 0.20
RSlow 0.10 RSlow 0.10 RSlow 0.60
IS Likelihood IS Likelihood IS Likelihood
ISfull 0.90 ISfull 0.80 ISfull 0.90
ISnone 0.10 ISnone 0.20 ISnone 0.10
PS Likelihood PS Likelihood PS Likelihood
PShigh 0.80 PShigh 0.80 PShigh 0.80
PSmed 0.10 PSmed 0.10 PSmed 0.10
PSlow 0.10 PSlow 0.10 PSlow 0.10
RS Likelihood RS Likelihood RS Likelihood
RShigh 0.70 RShigh 0.55 RShigh 0.50
RSmed 0.20 RSmed 0.30 RSmed 0.20
RSlow 0.10 RSlow 0.15 RSlow 0.30
IS Likelihood IS Likelihood IS Likelihood
ISfull 0.85 ISfull 0.70 ISfull 0.82
ISnone 0.15 ISnone 0.30 ISnone 0.18
PS Likelihood PS Likelihood PS Likelihood
PShigh 0.80 PShigh 0.80 PShigh 0.80
PSmed 0.10 PSmed 0.10 PSmed 0.10
PSlow 0.10 PSlow 0.10 PSlow 0.10
Contingency 1 Contingency 2 Contingency 3
Contingency 4 Contingency 5 Contingency 6
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Table A.2 Contingency Consequences 
 
CSj Lj Xj CSj Lj Xj CSj Lj Xj
CS1 0.504 0 CS1 0.512 0 CS1 0.144 0
CS2 0.063 120 CS2 0.064 150 CS2 0.018 5
CS3 0.063 200 CS3 0.064 400 CS3 0.018 6
CS4 0.056 500 CS4 0.128 1000 CS4 0.016 10
CS5 0.007 500 CS5 0.016 1000 CS5 0.002 10
CS6 0.007 500 CS6 0.016 1000 CS6 0.002 10
CS7 0.144 0 CS7 0.064 0 CS7 0.144 0
CS8 0.018 0 CS8 0.008 0 CS8 0.018 0
CS9 0.018 150 CS9 0.008 200 CS9 0.018 5
CS10 0.016 250 CS10 0.016 600 CS10 0.016 8
CS11 0.002 250 CS11 0.002 600 CS11 0.002 8
CS12 0.002 250 CS12 0.002 600 CS12 0.002 8
CS13 0.072 0 CS13 0.064 0 CS13 0.432 0
CS14 0.009 0 CS14 0.008 0 CS14 0.054 0
CS15 0.009 0 CS15 0.008 0 CS15 0.054 0
CS16 0.008 100 CS16 0.016 100 CS16 0.048 3
CS17 0.001 100 CS17 0.002 100 CS17 0.006 3
CS18 0.001 100 CS18 0.002 100 CS18 0.006 3
CSj Lj Xj CSj Lj Xj CSj Lj Xj
CS1 0.476 0 CS1 0.308 0 CS1 0.328 0
CS2 0.0595 15 CS2 0.0385 50 CS2 0.041 15
CS3 0.0595 30 CS3 0.0385 75 CS3 0.041 20
CS4 0.084 100 CS4 0.132 150 CS4 0.072 25
CS5 0.0105 100 CS5 0.0165 150 CS5 0.009 25
CS6 0.0105 100 CS6 0.0165 150 CS6 0.009 25
CS7 0.136 0 CS7 0.168 0 CS7 0.1312 0
CS8 0.017 0 CS8 0.021 0 CS8 0.0164 0
CS9 0.017 20 CS9 0.021 50 CS9 0.0164 15
CS10 0.024 20 CS10 0.072 100 CS10 0.0288 20
CS11 0.003 20 CS11 0.009 100 CS11 0.0036 20
CS12 0.003 20 CS12 0.009 100 CS12 0.0036 20
CS13 0.068 0 CS13 0.084 0 CS13 0.1968 0
CS14 0.0085 0 CS14 0.0105 0 CS14 0.0246 0
CS15 0.0085 0 CS15 0.0105 0 CS15 0.0246 0
CS16 0.012 15 CS16 0.036 40 CS16 0.0432 10
CS17 0.0015 15 CS17 0.0045 40 CS17 0.0054 10
CS18 0.0015 15 CS18 0.0045 40 CS18 0.0054 10
Contingency 1 Contingency 2 Contingency 3
Contingency 6Contingency 5Contingency 4
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Table A.3 Mitigation Option 1 Risk 
 
RSj Lj Xj RSj Lj Xj
RS1 1.25E-06 1104 RS33 0.000124 659
RS2 1.13E-05 1079 RS34 0.001114 635
RS3 1.25E-06 954 RS35 0.000124 509
RS4 1.13E-05 929 RS36 0.001114 485
RS5 3.75E-06 1004 RS37 0.000371 559
RS6 3.38E-05 979 RS38 0.003341 535
RS7 3.75E-06 854 RS39 0.000371 409
RS8 3.38E-05 829 RS40 0.003341 385
RS9 0.000005 1097 RS41 0.000495 653
RS10 0.000045 1072 RS42 0.004455 628
RS11 0.000005 947 RS43 0.000495 503
RS12 0.000045 922 RS44 0.004455 478
RS13 0.000015 997 RS45 0.001485 553
RS14 0.000135 972 RS46 0.013365 528
RS15 0.000015 847 RS47 0.001485 403
RS16 0.000135 822 RS48 0.013365 378
RS17 2.38E-05 726 RS49 0.002351 281
RS18 0.000214 701 RS50 0.021161 257
RS19 2.38E-05 576 RS51 0.002351 131
RS20 0.000214 551 RS52 0.021161 107
RS21 7.13E-05 626 RS53 0.007054 181
RS22 0.000641 601 RS54 0.063484 157
RS23 7.13E-05 476 RS55 0.007054 31
RS24 0.000641 451 RS56 0.063484 7
RS25 0.000095 719 RS57 0.009405 275
RS26 0.000855 694 RS58 0.084645 250
RS27 0.000095 569 RS59 0.009405 125
RS28 0.000855 544 RS60 0.084645 100
RS29 0.000285 619 RS61 0.028215 175
RS30 0.002565 594 RS62 0.253935 150
RS31 0.000285 469 RS63 0.028215 25
RS32 0.002565 444 RS64 0.253935 0
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Table A.4 Mitigation Option 2 Risk 
 
RSj Lj Xj RSj Lj Xj
RS1 2.5E-08 1726 RS33 2.48E-06 1281
RS2 2.25E-07 1701 RS34 2.23E-05 1257
RS3 2.48E-06 1576 RS35 0.000245 1131
RS4 2.23E-05 1551 RS36 0.002205 1107
RS5 7.5E-08 1626 RS37 7.43E-06 1181
RS6 6.75E-07 1601 RS38 6.68E-05 1157
RS7 7.43E-06 1476 RS39 0.000735 1031
RS8 6.68E-05 1451 RS40 0.006616 1007
RS9 1E-07 1719 RS41 9.9E-06 1275
RS10 9E-07 1694 RS42 8.91E-05 1250
RS11 9.9E-06 1569 RS43 0.00098 1125
RS12 8.91E-05 1544 RS44 0.008821 1100
RS13 3E-07 1619 RS45 2.97E-05 1175
RS14 2.7E-06 1594 RS46 0.000267 1150
RS15 2.97E-05 1469 RS47 0.00294 1025
RS16 0.000267 1444 RS48 0.026463 1000
RS17 4.75E-07 726 RS49 4.7E-05 281
RS18 4.28E-06 701 RS50 0.000423 257
RS19 4.7E-05 576 RS51 0.004655 131
RS20 0.000423 551 RS52 0.041899 107
RS21 1.43E-06 626 RS53 0.000141 181
RS22 1.28E-05 601 RS54 0.00127 157
RS23 0.000141 476 RS55 0.013966 31
RS24 0.00127 451 RS56 0.125698 7
RS25 1.9E-06 719 RS57 0.000188 275
RS26 1.71E-05 694 RS58 0.001693 250
RS27 0.000188 569 RS59 0.018622 125
RS28 0.001693 544 RS60 0.167597 100
RS29 5.7E-06 619 RS61 0.000564 175
RS30 5.13E-05 594 RS62 0.005079 150
RS31 0.000564 469 RS63 0.055866 25
RS32 0.005079 444 RS64 0.502791 0
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